Joint Approaches: Tackling Security Challenges at the 1st Security Services Symposium

The 1st Security Services Symposium, held on June 13, 2023, at the Victory Services Club in central London, provided a platform for practitioners, academics, and industry experts to address current and future security challenges. CENTRIC’s representative, Martin Snowden, QPM, shared insights on collaborative efforts to shape the future of security.

Organised by the Cranfield University and sponsored by UKRI, the symposium aimed to foster collaboration between UK security services, law enforcement agencies, and academia. By leveraging their expertise and resources, these diverse stakeholders worked together to tackle pressing security challenges.

Keynote speakers from the security sector explored the latest trends, technological advancements, and innovative approaches. Their expertise and experiences provided attendees with a comprehensive understanding of the security landscape.

The symposium highlighted the potential of academia to offer solutions to national security challenges. Universities showcased their research capabilities and academic rigour, emphasising the benefits of incorporating academic insights into real-world security operations.

Networking sessions allowed participants to connect, exchange ideas, and build relationships. These connections lay the foundation for future collaborations and joint endeavours beyond the symposium.

The symposium offered attendees a chance to contribute to solutions for security challenges. Engaging with leaders, experts, and academics provided invaluable insights and expanded professional networks. Collaboration and joint approaches were emphasised as crucial for ensuring the safety and security of communities.

The 1st Security Services Symposium was a pivotal event fostering collaboration to address security challenges. Attendees gained a comprehensive understanding of the evolving security landscape and potential solutions. Continued collaboration between security services, law enforcement agencies, and academia is essential to addressing emerging threats and creating a safer future for all.


CENTRIC and Europol’s Innovation Lab introduce the AP4AI self-assessment tool

On March 23rd CENTRIC took part in the CERIS workshop on the use of Artificial Intelligence for Security Purposes. Hosted by the European Commission’s DG HOME in Brussels, this event brought together 90 members of the EU Security Community.

During the first panel, which addressed how to consider the needs of law enforcement in both daily practise and the proposed AI Act, Professor Saskia Bayerl, Head of Research at CENTRIC, discussed the relevance of AI Accountability for the security domain and solutions proposed by the AP4AI project.

At the end of the panel, Gregory Mounier, Head of Europol Innovation Lab, Professor Babak Akhgar OBE, Director of CENTRIC, and Professor Bayerl announced the release of the first version of the AP4AI accountability self-assessment tool. This tool allows organisations to review and assess AI accountability in their domain across the full AI lifecycle.

The launch of the tool received a lot of attention since it represents a substantial contribution from the EU’s internal security sector to the discussion over the AI Act.

Read more about AP4AI here.


CENTRIC attended the Security and Policing event in Farnborough

CENTRIC attended the Home Office’s Security and Policing event at the Farnborough International Exhibition and Conference Centre hosted by the Joint Security and Resilience Centre (JSaRC) from 14th to 16th March 2023.

During the event, the CENTRIC team (represented by Babak Akhgar, Saskia Bayerl, Helen Gibson,  and Andrea Redhead) presented CENTRIC’s current capabilities. Specifically, projects such as SCAAN, AP4AI, APPRAISE, 3PO and CENTRIC’s range of serious games were displayed.

The event saw the launch of the Civil Security Research Partnership (CSRP), a collaboration between CENTRIC, Innovate UK, and Innovate UK KTN. The goal of this partnership is to bring together the science, technology, and innovation (ST&I) with the civil security stakeholder community.

The Security & Policing 2023 is the Official UK Government Global Security Event, and it offers a world-class opportunity to meet and discuss the latest advances in delivering national security and resilience with leading UK suppliers, UK and overseas government officials, and senior decision makers across the law enforcement and security sectors.

This year’s event was a great chance to strengthen security ties around the world. It brought together over 30 UK government departments, agencies, and partners, as well as over 330 of the world’s best suppliers and service providers.

Security & Policing is a closed event to attendees at the Farnborough International Exhibition and Conference Centre, continuing to host a secure and focused audience of Home Office approved visitors and exhibitors.

For further details on the Civil Security Research Partnership (CSRP), see here.


Professor Babak Akhgar, Director of CENTRIC, awarded OBE for services to security research

Professor Akhgar received the OBE, the second highest order of the British Empire award, in recognition of his services to security research.

A globally recognised leader in his field, Professor Akhgar’s pioneering research has made a considerable contribution to making the world a safer place through the development of innovative programmes to tackle organised crime, child sexual exploitation and terrorism.

Professor Akhgar is the director and founder of the Centre of Excellence in Terrorism, Resilience, Intelligence and Organised Crime Research (CENTRIC) at Sheffield Hallam University and has developed the Centre, bringing international renown and global influence.

Working with colleagues in CENTRIC, Professor Akhgar has brought together researchers, law enforcement agencies, policy makers and the public to bridge the gap between academic research and operational reality.

His commitment to security and tackling crime and cybercrime has helped CENTRIC forge hugely successful partnerships, including collaborations with Europol which have led to major advances in tackling cybercrime and cryptocurrency criminality and development of world first AI Accountability Framework for law enforcement agencies.


CENTRIC showcase research to HRH Duke of Sussex

On Thursday 25th July, 2019 HRH Duke of Sussex visited Sheffield Hallam University to learn about the university’s commitment to applied research and addressing challenges in society.

The CENTRIC team were thrilled to be given the opportunity to meet the Duke and showcase our significant collaboration with UN Migration and the World Health Organisation on the SCAAN system. The team explained to the Duke how the system operates and gave a demonstration of how it would be used in the field.

 

SCAAN is a vital tool, currently being used in the field to help maintain staff security for both UN Migration and the World Health Organisation, if you would like to find out more watch this short film: SCAAN: Enhancing Staff Security

 


CENTRIC Cyber Winning National Awards

A team from CENTRIC met with members of the Protect Team at the Yorkshire and Humber Regional Cyber Crime Unit, to celebrate their successes at the recent National Cyber Awards and discuss continuing their award-winning collaboration. The ‘CYBER CENTRIC’ serious game that the two teams worked together to produce won two awards in April: Learning Innovation in Cyber Awareness and Most Original Cyber Security Product. The game beat more than 200 other nominees and was the only entry to be awarded two prizes. The game is being used throughout the region and beyond to encourage behavioural change in businesses in respect of cyber security. The innovative, educational game will be rolled out on a national level in early June. Keen to maintain momentum, the teams already have plans for further exciting work that combines academic excellence with professional expertise to turn research into reality and bring about positive change.

To find out more about the national cyber awards click here.

 


Why we need to think carefully about data collection practices

Due to well-publicized scandals – from Snowden to Cambridge Analytica – as well as new privacy regulations (chief amongst them GDPR in the EU), online users become increasingly aware of the scale of behavioural tracking practices, and they are clearly worried. According to recent PEW reviews, for instance, only 12% of internet users feel confident that their government to protect their data (Rainie, 2018) and 34% have changed their behaviour because of (suspected) government surveillance (Geiger, 2018).

Research into reactions to online surveillance identified three basic ways online users react to what they perceive as privacy invasions (Poddar et al., 2009):

  1. Don’t care and continue as they have done before,
  2. Opt out of services or discontinue the use of certain websites and applications, or
  3. Strategically manage the information they provide ranging from not providing certain types of information to consciously providing false information or employing privacy-enhancing technologies to mask online behaviours; a strategy we refer to as ‘truth management’

To these three ‘conscious’ strategies we can add a fourth mechanism, namely unconscious changes in user behaviours. Examples are avoiding the use of embarrassing keywords in searches (Marthew and Tucker, 2014) or the reluctance to discuss political topics online and offline (Hampton, Rainie, Lu et al., 2014). Hampton et al.’s findings are especially worrisome as they demonstrate that online monitoring can have chilling effects even in our offline lives.

These conscious and unconscious reactions to online surveillance, create challenges for data analytics, amongst them the increasing likelihood of developing faulty models, a faster decay of models and a general reduction of (cheaply) available data (cp. Bayerl and Akhgar, 2015).

The current reaction is often to develop even more powerful analytics and technological solutions including Artificial Intelligence. On the other side stand efforts invoking ‘counter-movements’ such as “anti-surveillance coats” (projectkovr.com) or “anti-CCTV makeups” (cvdazzle.com) – a dynamic that seems to create ever-faster and sophisticated games of “hide and seek”.

The solution is obviously not to go to the other extreme of ‘no behavioural tracking at all’. Rather, it is a question of managing expectations – and understanding the consequences of the public’s increasing awareness of continuous, deep-reaching surveillance of their daily lives. Sensible data practices remain a balancing act. Some will always stay wary and reluctant to share information online, and it is their good right not to; others are changing their behaviour out of genuine anger or concern.

What needs to come in its place is a better understanding of how surveillance practices are shaping behaviours online and offline and the economic and social costs involved in this continuing cycle of action and reaction. It is time to understand, where behavioural tracking is useful, how it can be done in a sensible way, and where unintended consequences threaten social cohesion as well as the long-term viability of current security practices.

References

Bayerl, P.S., & Akhgar, B. (2015). Surveillance and falsification implications for Open Source Intelligence Investigations. Communications of the ACM, 58(8), 62-69.
Hampton, K.N., Rainie, L., Lu, W., Dwyer, M., Shin, I., & Purcell, K. (2014). Social Media and the ‘Spiral of Silence.’ Pew Research Center, Washington, DC. Available at http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/08/26/social-media-and-the-spiral-of-silence/
Marthew, A. & Tucker, C. (2014). Government Surveillance and Internet Search Behavior, MIT Sloan School of Management. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2412564
Poddar, A., Mosteller, J., & Ellen, P.S. (2009). Consumers’ rules of engagement in online information exchanges. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 43(3), 419-448.

 

Author: P. Saskia Bayerl
Date: 16 May 2019

Virtual Reality at the European Commissions Open Day

CENTRIC attended the EU Open Day at the European Commission’s Berlaymont building in Brussels on 4th May 2019. The event was open to members of the public to showcase examples of projects that had received EU funding. CENTRIC demonstrated the AUGGMED project as part of the DG Migration and Home Affairs stand.

AUGGMED is a serious games platform which utilises innovations in modern technology including virtual reality, mixed reality, and artificial intelligence to provide a cooperative training platform. The platform is intended to enable police, security forces and counter-terrorist units as well as first responders to train their staff in different VR environments with different scenarios and apply this training in the real infrastructure environment using mixed reality techniques.

Find out more about the EU open day here.

 

 

 


Re-evaluating the double standard narrative of labelling terrorist attacks

The rise in right-wing attacks in modern society has had a profound effect on the current understandings of how the incidents should be addressed, calling for not only a political change but also a cultural one. The semantic labelling of far-right attacks following the recent timeline of events has unearthed a dominant historical framework which lacks understanding of the fundamental meaning and purpose of the attacks that often becomes overshadowed and concealed in much of its coverage. This archaic cultural ideology has become intertwined with current understandings of right-wing attacks, which results in the framing of the incidents as ‘political’ rather than ‘terrorist’ by the government and wider society reinforced by the mass media. This label has particularly for white offenders become a myogenic labelling process meaning that they avoid being associated with the ‘terrorist’ stigma, which can be reflected upon following the aftermath of recent attacks in Charlottesville. In this case the offender was charged with murder and hate crimes although the attorney initially described the attack as ‘the definition of domestic terrorism.’ Previous cases demonstrate an overarching double standard in how different perpetrators of terrorism offences are portrayed which is embedded in the political and judicial infrastructure of the majority of societies.

These labels allow a large proportion of right-wing offenders to ‘escape’ from more serious charges including counts of terrorism and extremism, alongside the negative social stigmas that come parallel to the detrimental framing of the offender’s identity. Instead they are given a cultural, political and lawful bypass into being treated as significantly less severe as other well established terrorist groups such as radical Islamic extremists who are at the forefront of the political, media and cultural attention. The media has taken a pivotal role in disseminating the double standard culture into the social sphere through associating non-terrorism labels with the identity of right-wing attackers. The media has reinforced this concept through the association of non-terrorism labels with the identity of right-wing attackers such as ‘shooters, suspects and white-supremacists.’ Whilst for similar instances the media directly links Islamist attacks (of the same nature) including the Manchester bombings and Las Ramblas attacks as undeniably terrorist incidents.

Previous instances have been pivotal in understanding the political and social relationship between far-right attacks and terrorism which has created a pool of misunderstanding as an unprecedented by-product within modern culture. This narrative has had detrimental consequences for many Western communities that are sub-consciously prioritising their efforts into the prevention of international radical Islamist terrorist threats which has produced a greater circumference for domestic far-right terrorism threats to expand in both capacity and severity.

To fully understand the true velocity of upcoming terrorism threats, the Christchurch shootings has re-emphasised that the global political and social innocence surrounding right-wing extremism as a severe terrorist threat needs to be re-evaluated. The recent attack in Christchurch has resurfaced the double standard narrative, leading to many discussions within both academia and politics surrounding the current injustice within the terrorism framework and how this negatively affects the political and judicial systems. The event has led to a progressive movement towards understanding and reframing right-wing attacks as a direct form of terrorism. The New Zealand prime minister Jacinda Arden has been at the forefront of this change through explicitly highlighting the coherent relationship between the Christchurch attacks and terrorism. These actions have significantly changed how the scale and severity of right-wing extremism is understood and has recognised right-wing extremism as an underrepresented threat that needs to be addressed consistently as an equal threat to other well-established extremist groups.

This framework has rippled into the New Zealand Home Affairs with positive and progressive effects, which has rededicated its efforts to tackling white supremacy as an extremist ideology. Although this change may only be representative of one community, the effects and global impact of the Christchurch attack has shown promise for a nuanced and upcoming narrative of understanding right-wing extremism that is influencing cultural, political and societal change to reframing its relationship with understanding modern terrorism threats. The actions made by New Zealand should be an example for other law enforcement agencies, as refocusing efforts and removing the double standard will allow agencies to truly grasp the velocity and origin of upcoming threats.

This will require a societal change from the current archaic ideology that there is a single overarching terrorist threat, which will undeniably push a new framework that recognises that the origins of security threats are as domestic as they are international*. By realigning the ideologies woven into the judicial, law enforcement and societal frameworks societies can become truly equipped and knowledgeable about upcoming threats and can plan public safety accordingly.

* See e.g., CENTRIC’s TRANSRAD project

 

Author: Alice Raven
Date: 30 April 2019

Understanding Drivers of Cyberterrorism

Cybercrime is indeed cyberterrorism’s nucleus, combing the adoption of continuously advanced information technology tools and techniques with the usage of the internet to conduct harmful actions that target vital infrastructure systems leading to economic losses, political chaos, environmental damage and loss of life (Hardy and Williams, 2014).

Continuous advancement of information technologies and the increased dependencies on them – witnessed by the exponential evolution of the Internet of Things – dictate the need to investigate further cyberterrorists’ behaviours with the objective of preventing cyberterrorists’ actions as well as mitigating them.

The “Social Bond Theory”, a theory from the criminology literature proposed by Hirschi in 1969, has been used in the information systems’ domain to understand the drivers behind cybercrime. It proposes that people with stronger social ties, mainly attachment and interest in social surroundings, commitment towards socially accepted goals, involvement in conventional social activities and having strong personal norms and value systems, are usually less susceptible to exhibiting abnormal or antisocial behaviour (Hirschi, 1969).

In 2008, Jaishankar proposed a new theory, “Space Transition Theory”, to explain the causes of crimes in cyberspace, as he believed that general criminology theory was inadequate (Jaishankar, 2008). His theory explores and explains the nature a person’s behaviour, which brings out their conforming and non-conforming behaviour in the physical and cyber space. Space Transition Theory is based on number of hypotheses:

  1. Persons with repressed criminal behaviour (in the physical space) have a propensity to commit crime in cyberspace, which, otherwise they would not commit in physical space, due to their status and position.
  2. Identity flexibility, dissociative Anonymity and the lack of deterrence in the cyberspace provide offenders the choice to commit cybercrime.
  3. Criminal behaviour of offenders in cyberspace is likely to be imported to physical space.
  4. Intermittent ventures of offenders into the cyberspace and the dynamic spatio-temporal nature of cyberspace provide the chance to escape.
  5. Strangers are likely to unite together in cyberspace to commit crime in the physical space. And associates in physical space are likely to unite to commit crime in cyberspace.
  6. Persons from a ‘closed society’ are more likely to commit crimes in cyberspace than persons from an ‘open society’.
  7. The conflict of norms and values of physical space with the norms and values of cyberspace may lead to cybercrimes.

It is apparent that the Space Transition Theory considers elements of the Social Bond Theory and tries to test proposed social bonds in the cyberspace domain; for instance, personal norms and values as well as involvement in social activities. This theory definitely contributed to cybercrime theories, but what about cyberterrorism? Space Transition Theory considers two factors that lead to cyberterrorism: repressed criminal behaviour in the physical space (1st hypothesis) and the unity of strangers in cyberspace to commit crime in the physical space (5th hypothesis). But what about other factors?

It is worth asking further questions; for instance to what extent the Space Transition Theory considers the potential of individuals’ observations, personality characteristics and socio-cultural settings on behaviours (cp. Social Learning and Social Cognitive Theories; Bandura, 1971; 1986)? Is it possible to establish linkages with the Relative Deprivation Theory of Terrorism, which is based on the premise that socio-political settings and situations influence ways of behaving and living of the individuals in specific environments (Abbasi et al., 2017)? How does the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis, which proposes that aggression is the result of blocking or frustrating a person’s efforts to attain a goal (Friedman and Schustack, 2014), relate to cyberterrorism?

All these questions stress the need to explore a hybrid theory that considers further the social and psychological aspects of human behaviour of groups rather than individuals in cyberspace; a theory that explores to what extent relative deprivation nourishes cyberterrorism and whether there are other criminology and terrorism theories that can be explored and adapted to understand further the social and psychological drivers of cyberterrorism.

References

Abbasi, I., Khatwani, M.K, & Soomro, H. (2017). A review of psycho-social theories of terrorism. Journal of Grassroots, 51 (2), http://sujo-old.usindh.edu.pk/index.php/Grassroots/article/view/4079.

Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory. Prentice-Hall. Bandura, A. (1971). Social Learning Theory. General Learning Corporation.

Friedman, H., Schustack, M. (2014). Personality: Classic theories and modern research (5 ed.). Boston: Pearson.

Hardy, K. & Williams, G. (2014). What is ‘cyberterrorism’? Computer and internet technology in legal definitions of terrorism. In: Th. Chen, L. Jarvis, S. Macdonald (eds.), Cyberterrorism (pp. 1–23). Springer.

Hirschi, T. (1969). Causes of Delinquency. University of California Press.

Jaishankar, K. (2008). Space transition theory of cybercrimes. In F. Schmallager, M. Pittaro (eds.), Crimes of the Internet. (pp. 283-301). Prentice Hall.

 

Author: Yara Abdel Samar
Date: 29 April 2019